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Note
After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and
the Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801
Jed Glickstein*
Most law students encounter the midnight judges, if at all, in a footnote
to "perhaps the most famous case in American history."' In the words of
the judges' foremost historiographer, "the appointment of the 'midnight
judges' has lingered because it affords the appropriate essential for a
springboard introduction to an analysis of John Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison."2 To summarize: Thomas Jefferson and the
Democratic-Republicans defeated the reigning Federalist Party, led by
President John Adams, in the election of 1800. In response, the lame-duck
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2013; Yale University, B.A. 2008. This Note has bcnefitted from
the assistance of many more people than I can list here, but particularly Christian Burset, Josh
Chafetz, Neil Conrad, Ben Eidelson, Yeney Hernandez, and the Legal History & Rare Books Special
Interest Section of the American Association of Law Libraries. I owe a special debt of gratitude to
Erica Stem, for whom patience is just one of many virtues.
1. Susan Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v.
Madison, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 301, 301.
2. Kathryn Turner, The Judiciary Act of 1801, at 300 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Federalists tried to shore up their position in the short time before Adams
left office. Just a few weeks before Jefferson's inauguration, the outgoing
Federalist Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, creating sixteen
new federal circuit judgeships. 3 In a separate act, Congress created three
additional circuit judgeships and over forty justices of the peace for the
District of Columbia.' Adams hastily filled as many of these positions as
he could with his supporters. As a Federalist senator famously observed to
a friend, his party was "about to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind;
can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship thro the
storm?"5
In short order, however, President Jefferson and the Republicans
regained the initiative. Shrugging off the Federalists' protests, the new
Congress repealed the Judiciary Act, abolished the new courts, and put the
so-called "midnight judges" out of their jobs.' Jefferson also ordered his
Secretary of State to ignore some signed commissions that the Adams
administration had forgotten to deliver to justices of the peace during the
chaotic changeover, leading William Marbury and several other would-be
JPs to sue to get hold of their commissions. Marbury lost, but in deciding
his case Chief Justice John Marshall promulgated what has become the
classic statement of judicial review, the proposition that courts have the
power to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress.'
The midnight judges, by contrast, never even came before the Court. In
the standard account, they managed only a meek protest before giving up
the fight:
Certain of the deposed National judges had, indeed, taken steps to
bring the . .. measure before the Supreme Court, but their energies
flagged, their hearts failed, and their only action was a futile and
foolish protest to the very Congress that had wrested their judicial
seats from under them.8
Beyond these cursory facts, the judges largely faded from historical
memory.
In 1961, Kathryn Turner first treated the midnight judges as an object of
study in their own right, giving a superb exposition of the harried process
that led to their appointments.9 However, despite an outpouring of work
3. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
4. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 12, 2 Stat. 103.
5. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Robert Livingston (Feb. 20, 1801), in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 714
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1985).
6. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. 3 ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 123 (1919).
9. Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1961).
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on Jefferson, Marshall, and the federal judiciary in the fifty years since
Turner's piece, not enough attention has been paid to the second-and in
many ways more intriguing-half of the judges' story: their response to
the abolition of their offices. Most scholarship mentions only in passing
that the judges sent a written memorial to Congress (the protest referred to
above).'o And while some have treated the subject in relatively more
detail," or remarked upon the actions of individual judges,' 2 there is as
yet no comprehensive treatment of what the midnight judges did
following the repeal and why. Despite its casual notoriety, in other words,
there is still a need for "some further information" about this major
constitutional episode.1 3
This Note draws on a variety of primary sources, including an
overlooked cache of the judges' letters held at the Maryland Historical
Society, to sketch out the midnight judges' deliberations in full. Its
primary goal is to show that the midnight judges were not just a "futile
and foolish" stop on the road to Marbury. To the contrary, the judges
thoughtfully and conscientiously sought to challenge the constitutionality
of the repeal of the Judiciary Act, even if their efforts did not culminate in
the restoration of their offices. The picture that emerges from these
sources does more than just recast the role of the midnight judges,
however. It also offers new insights into the ways in which Federalists in
all branches of government both resisted and capitulated to the emerging
political order ushered in by the election of 1800. Ultimately, this new
account argues for a revised understanding that puts the midnight judges,
if not on the marquee, at least in a supporting role in working out the
meaning of the repeal.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I outlines the constitutional
10. See, e.g., RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE
YOUNG REPUBLIC 64 (1971); GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER, JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 177-80 (1981); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME
134 n.64 (1970); R. KENT NEWMEYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 154 (2001); CLIFF SLOAN & DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION: JEFFERSON, ADAMS,
MARSHALL AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT 127-28 (2009); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE
OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 419-21 (2009); see also Erwin
Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 53, 64 (1958).
11. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 128-42, 172-81 (2005);
Wythe Holt, '[I]fthe Courts have firmness enough to render the decision,' in EGBERT BENSON, FIRST
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1801-1802), at 10 (David Nourse & Wythe Holt eds., 1987)
(giving the most detailed account to date).
12. See D. KURT GRAHAM, TO BRING THE LAW HOME: THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IN EARLY
NATIONAL RHODE ISLAND 74-86 (2010) (remarking on the actions of Judge Benjamin Bourne); JOHN
PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW
HAMPSHIRE 71-89 (2009) (remarking on the actions of Judge Jeremiah Smith); Linda Kerber, Oliver
Wolcott: Midnight Judge, 32 CONN. HIST. SOC'Y BULL. 25 (1967) (remarking on the actions of Judge
Oliver Wolcott).
13. Cf Turner, supra note 9, at 494 ("It is the purpose of this Article to provide some further
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controversy over the repeal of the Judiciary Act. Part II discusses the
Supreme Court's response, culminating with Marbury v. Madison and the
lesser-known Stuart v. Laird, important decisions that nonetheless left the
central question of the repeal unanswered. Part III briefly corrects a
persistent historical error that continues to confound attempts to figure out
why this might be the case. Part IV describes the midnight judges' early
efforts to bring their case to judicial resolution, efforts that intersected in
notable ways with the parallel deliberations occurring at the Supreme
Court. Part V describes how, with the judicial avenue blocked, the judges
ultimately turned to Congress in a last-ditch attempt to salvage their
claims. Finally, Part VI concludes by examining the aftermath of the
midnight judges' efforts.
I.
The Federalists contemplated changes to the federal courts well before
their defeat in the election of 1800.14 Although the Judiciary Act of 1801
was undoubtedly enacted for crassly political reasons, it also addressed
several legitimate criticisms of the original Judiciary Act of 1789. For
example, the 1789 Act did not create any independent circuit courts.
Instead, the Supreme Court justices periodically left Washington, D.C. to
"ride circuit" and presided over circuit courts themselves. The justices had
detested circuit riding almost from the start, in part for its physical
discomforts,' 5 and in part because they harbored doubts about its
constitutionality.' 6 The 1801 Act created permanent circuit courts staffed
with full-time judges, relieving the Supreme Court of the need to ride
circuit. The Act also made important changes to the scope of federal
authority. In response to worries about the partiality of state courts, for
instance, it granted general federal question jurisdiction to the federal
courts for the first time.' 7 The result was a federal judiciary that was
larger and more pervasive than ever before.' 8
14. See Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 3
(1965).
15. See Letter from Thomas Johnson to George Washington (Jan. 16, 1793), in I THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 80 (describing resigning from the
Court to avoid "spend[ing] six Months ... on Roads at Taverns chiefly and often in Situations where
the most moderate Desires are disappointed").
16. While riding circuit, the justices would sometimes sit as trial judges and preside over cases
outside the narrow grant of Supreme Court original jurisdiction prescribed in the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 (giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over "all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party").
17. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (conferring jurisdiction over "all cases in law
or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the United States").
18. See Alison LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From Sovereignty to
Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345.
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These changes were anathema to many Republicans, certainly, but they
hated the partisan aspects of the Judiciary Act even more. Not only did
the Federalists force through a controversial expansion of the federal
judiciary after they were repudiated at the polls, but Adams chose to staff
the new courts with his own supporters instead of leaving the positions for
Jefferson to fill. Republicans found the judicial appointments particularly
obnoxious because, unlike executive officials whom Jefferson could (and
often did) remove at will," the Constitution appeared to grant federal
judges life tenure. And there was a further wrinkle: the 1801 Act reduced
the size of the Supreme Court from six to five, with the change taking
place at the next vacancy.2 0 In other words, Jefferson would not be able to
make an appointment to the Court until two justices died or retired.
Still, Adams had to move quickly once the Act was passed, since
Jefferson would take office in March 1801. Although his administration
was largely successful in packing the new courts, they did make some
embarrassing blunders. Some nominees unexpectedly turned down
judgeships, setting off a scramble to find replacements; several
appointees, including two senators who resigned from Congress,
accidentally received worthless commissions to offices that were either
occupied or did not exist.2 ' But when the dust settled, Adams had
appointed thirteen new circuit judges: Benjamin Bourne, John Lowell,
and Jeremiah Smith in the First Circuit; Egbert Benson, Samuel
Hitchcock, and Oliver Wolcott, Jr. in the Second; Richard Bassett,
William Griffith, and William Tilghman in the Third; Philip Key, George
Taylor, and Charles Magill in the Fourth; and William McClung in the
Sixth.2 2 Although some of the appointments were questionable, generally
the men were neither overly partisan nor obviously unqualified.2 3
It has often gone unnoticed that Adams failed to place any circuit
judges at all in the newly created Fifth Circuit, comprising North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. The Senate did confirm three
19. See Carl Prince, The Passing of the Aristocracy: Jefferson's Removal of the Federalists,
1801-1805, 57 J. AM. HIST. 563 (1970).
20. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89.
21. Turner, supra note 9, at 498 n.31, 509-10, 511, 514. Incredibly, but for these erroneous
commissions, the Federalists would have retained a Senate majority in the Seventh Congress, and
could have blocked the repeal of the Judiciary Act at least until the following election. See
ACKERMAN, supra note I1, at 138.
22. In the Sixth Circuit, comprising the new states of Tennessee and Kentucky, Congress
provided only a single circuit judge who held court in conjunction with district judges, not unlike the
old circuit-riding model. Judiciary Act of 1801 § 7, 2 Stat. 89.
23. See id. at 521-22; see also 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 761 (1953) (giving a-perhaps excessively-
spirited defense of the appointments); Note, The United States Courts and the New Court Bill, 10 AM.
L. REv. 398, 402 (1875) (opining that the judges, "although too much from one political party, were




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Adams nominees to the Fifth: Thomas Bee, John Sitgreaves, and Joseph
Clay, Jr., all sitting district judges.24 However, Bee, who received his
circuit commission after Jefferson took office, declined the position,
explaining that he preferred to remain a district judge and "assigning as a
reason his inability to undergo the fatigue incident to that office."
Sitgreaves similarly rejected Adams' offer, and Joseph Clay completed
the trifecta.26 That all three turned down their positions suggests that
something more than mere "fatigue," as Bee put it, was at work. Probably
the men recognized the coming political realignment, which would
decimate the Federalist Party in the South, and decided it was best not to
antagonize the new regime. 27
That turn of events gave Jefferson a chance to make his own
nominations to the Fifth Circuit. A flurry of office-seekers descended on
the President.28 He ultimately nominated two Republicans, Henry Potter
and Dominic Augustin Hall, to replace Sitgreaves and Bee respectively.29
Jefferson had trouble filling Clay's slot, however. He wrote to
Representative James Jackson in Georgia "to give me information as to
the characters you think best qualified for the appointment," stressing that
they must be "of republican principles."3 0 In reply, Jackson lamented that
lawyers with "integrity and republican principles . . . are rarely found"
and offered one William Stephens as "the least tinctured with modern
24. Turner,supra note 9, at 514-15.
25. Letter from Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 9, 1801), in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 558 (Barbara Oberg ed., 2006) [hereinafter PAPERS OF JEFFERSON].
26. See Letter from Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 21, 1801), in 33 PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 389 (informing Jefferson of Sitgreaves's refusal); Letter from Levi
Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 16, 1801), in 33 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 596
(informing Jefferson of Clay's refusal); Letter from Matthew McAllister to Thomas Jefferson (Apr.
15, 1801), in 33 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 593 (2006) (informing Jefferson of Clay's
refusal).
27. See generally JAMES H. BROUSSARD, THE SOUTHERN FEDERALISTS, 1800-1816 (1978)
(discussing the decline of the Federalist Party in the South following the election of 1800).
28. See Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Thomas Jefferson (May 1, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 3 (offering candidates to replace Clay); Letter from James Jackson to
Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 591-94 (responding
to a request from Jefferson for candidates to replace Clay); Letter from Nathaniel Macon to Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 20, 1801), in 33 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 620 (proposing Henry Potter
to replace Sitgreaves); Letter from Matthew McAllister to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 15, 1801), in 33
PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 593 (offering himself to fill Clay's vacancy); Letter from
Charles Pinckney (May 26, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 186 (recommending
several candidates for Bee's position); Letter from Ephraim Ramsay to Thomas Jefferson (May 2,
1801), in 34 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 14 (proposing Colonel Alexander Moultrie to
fill Bee's circuit vacancy).
29. See 36 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 318-19 (listing interim appointments
including Potter and Hall). There is some confusion on this point. For example, Carl Prince
erroneously states that Jefferson did not replace Bee "because he knew [the circuit court] would
probably be abolished." Prince, supra note 19, at 568.
30. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Jackson (May 28, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON,
supra note 25, at 197.
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federalism of any of the old Lawyers at the bar."3 1 Uninspired by such
faint praise, Jefferson chose to leave the final seat vacant.
It is somewhat ironic that Jefferson would even seek to nominate judges
to a court he was preparing to abolish. At this stage, he knew that the jobs
would be temporary. As he wrote to a congressional ally in North
Carolina concerning Potter's nomination, Jefferson merely hoped that
"[Mr.] Potts [sic] may be willing to stop the gap till you meet & repeal the
law."32 The prospect of repeal appears to have dissuaded some potential
candidates. Charles Pinckney frankly told Jefferson that the prevailing
opinion in South Carolina was that the 1801 Act would be repealed or
greatly altered, which "produces a [g]eneral indisposition on the part of
qualified men to accept."" Still, federal judgeships, even fleeting ones,
were choice positions of patronage, and Jefferson may also have been
hedging in case the repeal effort failed.
On January 6, 1802, Senator John Breckinridge proposed the repeal of
the Judiciary Act.34 The debates over repeal occupied hundreds of pages
in the Congressional journals." Federalists tried to make a pragmatic case
for the expanded federal courts, but the real dispute turned on the
constitutional question of whether Congress could abolish the office of a
sitting judge. Both sides could point to relevant text in Article III. On the
one hand, by vesting "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States .. . in such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish," the Constitution granted Congress broad authority to tinker
with the structure of the lower federal courts.36 On the other, Article III
guaranteed federal judges tenure "during good behaviour" and an
undiminished salary "during their continuance in office," suggesting that
Congress did not have plenary authority to dismiss sitting judges. 37
Although Republicans admitted that they could not interfere with a
judge's tenure and salary while his office existed, they argued that
Congress could abolish the office itself, particularly because they
perceived the new circuit courts as expensive, unnecessary, and inimical
3 1. Letter from James Jackson to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON,
supra note 25, at 592.
32. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nathaniel Macon (May 14, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 109-10.
33. Letter from Charles Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson (May 26, 1801), in 34 PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 186.
34. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 45.
35. For helpful summaries of the debate, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS (1801-1809), at 12-19 (2001); and LINDA KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN
DISSENT 136-65 (2d ed. 1980).
36. U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 1, cl. 1.
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to the popular will.38 The Federalists replied that that distinction between
office and officeholder was entirely specious.39 Some called for the courts
to exercise judicial review and strike down the repeal as
unconstitutional.40 They further denied that the latest election represented
anything but the whim of a transient majority, and warned of dire
consequences if Congress cast aside the Constitution's safeguards.
In theory, a few defectors in the Senate could swing the vote to the
Federalists, but as the debates stretched into a second month, it became
apparent that the Republicans would not budge. Senator James Hillhouse
confided to his friend, the midnight judge Oliver Wolcott, that "[t]he most
impressive eloquence will not change a single vote."4' The Repeal Act
narrowly passed the Senate on February 13. On March 3, it passed the
House of Representatives, where the Republicans enjoyed a greater
majority, by a much more comfortable margin. President Jefferson signed
the bill into law five days later.42 An editorial in the Washington
Federalist typified, that party's sentiments, lamenting, "The fatal Bill has
passed: Our Constitution is no more."4 3
II.
Some Federalists now contemplated independent efforts to challenge
the repeal," but for the most part they decided to see how the Supreme
Court would react. The Court was scheduled to convene in June, a month
before the repeal went into effect.45 In April, however, Republicans
canceled the June term.46 This change meant that the Court would not
formally meet until February 1803, almost a year away. In the meantime,
the justices would be expected to ride circuit under the original Judiciary
Act of 1789, which had been resurrected upon the repeal of the 1801 Act.
38. See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 25-30 (Jan. 8, 1802) (statement of Sen. Breckenridge).
39. For a colorful exampic, see Gouverneur Morris's sarcastic statement on the floor of
Congress: "[Y]ou shall not take the man from the office, but you may take the office from the man;
you shall not drown him, but you may sink his boat under him." II ANNALS OF CONG. 39 (Jan. 8,
1802).
40. See, e.g., II ANNALS OF CONG. 164 (statement of Sen. Ross) ("If [Congress] should rashly
exceed the delegated power [of the Constitution], our Judiciary . . . must declare that the great
irrepealable statute made by the people shall restrain and control the unauthorized acts of agents.").
41. Letter from James Hillhouse to Oliver Wolcott (Feb. 20, 1802) (on file with Conn. Historical
Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
42. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
43. WASH. FEDERALIST, Mar. 3, 1802, at 2.
44. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Mar. 15, 1802), in 25
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 562-63 (Harold Syrctt ed., 1961) (calling a meeting of Federalists
to discuss strategy after the repeal).
45. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802 § 2, 2 Stat. at 132.
46. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 1, 2 Stat. 156, 156 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court ... shall have one
session in each and every year, to commence on the first Monday of February annually. . . .").
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Republicans claimed they canceled the June term because the Court did
not have enough business to require two sessions a year, but this fooled
few observers-least of all the justices.47 Riding circuit would amount to
a tacit acceptance of the repeal's validity, so the change forced the justices
to decide on a course of action without consulting face-to-face.
Chief Justice Marshall watched these developments closely. Not only
was he the head of the federal judiciary, but he had also helped to draft
the Judiciary Act as a member of the House of Representatives in 1800.48
Moreover, just as Congress prepared to pass the Judiciary Act in early
1801, Adams named Marshall to the Supreme Court, asking that he also
remain as acting Secretary of State until the presidential transition.4 9 In
this dual role, Marshall likely exercised unique influence over the
selection of the midnight judges, although precisely how much remains
unclear. 50
After Congress canceled the June term in April, Marshall wrote to his
colleagues:
It having now become apparent that there will be no session of the
supreme court . . . holden in June next & that we shall be directed
to ride the circuits, before we can consult on the course proper to
be taken by us, it appears to me proper that the Judges should
communicate their sentiments on this subject to each other that
they may act understandingly & in the same manner.
He went on to state that the "late discussions . . . [have] unavoidably
produced an investigation of the subject" of circuit riding, and he
admitted to doubts about the legality of the practice. However, he stressed
the importance of unanimity and agreed to abide by the others' opinions
on the matter.52
Scholars have debated whether Marshall was serious about resisting
circuit riding at this initial stage.5 ' This is an interesting issue, to be sure,
but for the purposes of this Note, the correspondence is more notable for
what was missing entirely: any reference to the midnight judges. The
omission is surprising, to put it mildly. As the head of the federal
judiciary, Marshall presumably owed something to his brethren, whose
47. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel Chase to William Paterson (Apr. 6, 1802) (on file with N.Y.
Pub. Library, William Paterson Papers) ("The object of postponing the Meeting of the Judges of the
Supreme Court until February is obvious.").
48. See Turner, supra note 14, at 10, 14.
49. See Kathryn Turner, The Appointment of Chief Justice Marshall, 17 WM. & MARY Q. 143
(1960).
50. Turner, supra note 9, at 495-96.
51. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 108 (Charles Hobson ed., 1974) [hereinafter PAPERS OF MARSHALL].
52. Id.
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roles he would supplant by riding circuit. He had personally signed their
commissions and counted former colleagues among their number,
including two in-laws.5 4 Yet neither professional responsibility nor
personal interest moved the Chief Justice to broach the subject. One might
think there was no point in raising it until the Court had agreed to resist
riding circuit. Still, this only explains why Marshall did not push for
strong action concerning the midnight judges immediately; it does not
explain why he neglected to mention them at all. More likely, the Chief
Justice simply did not want to stick out his neck for a handful of dubious
appointments. If so, this would not be the last time the pragmatic Marshall
compromised his Federalist principles in order to fight another day.
Nearly all of Marshall's colleagues followed his lead and focused
entirely on the circuit riding question." Only Justice Samuel Chase, an
ardent Federalist whom the Republicans would nearly remove from office
in 1804, spoke out on the matter. Rather than address the question
Marshall asked, Chase began by declaring the Repeal Act constitutionally
suspect:
It is a great doubt with me, whether the Circuit Courts, established
by the Law, can be abolished; but I have no doubt, that the circuit
Judges cannot, directly, or indirectly, be deprived of their Offices,
or Commissions, or Salaries, during their lives; unless only on
impeachment ... as prescribed in the Constitution."
Nevertheless, he was skeptical that the Court would have the opportunity
to rule on the issue: "If the Constitutionality of this Act could be brought
before the Supreme Court, by action of assize of Office, or by action to
recover the Salary, I should decide . . . that the Act is void. . . . But by
neither of those modes, nor by any other (as Mandamus, & Quo
Warranto) could remedy be obtained."" As a result, the justices had to
treat the circuit riding question delicately: "This Defect of Remedy to
obtain a Right . . . will induce every judge of the Supreme Court to act
with the greatest caution; and he must, in my judgment, decline to execute
the office of a Circuit Judge, if he apprehends that he shall, thereby,
violate the Constitutional Rights of the Circuit Judges.""
54. See Turner, supra note 9, at 513, 516. A copy of Tilghman's commission, signed by
Marshall, can be found in Box 13, Folder 18 of the Tilghman Family Papers, MS 2821, Maryland
Historical Society. See also Letter from John Marshall to Oliver Wolcott (Feb. 21, 1801) (on file with
N.Y. Pub. Library, Gibbs-Wolcott Papers) (enclosing Wolcott's commission and requesting his
acceptance).
55. 1 am not the first to make this observation. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 11, at 15-16; Louise
weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1236, 1281 n.181 (2003).
56. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
supra note 51, at 110 (emphasis omitted).
57. Id. at 113.
58. Id. (emphasis omitted); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The
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Even after he turned to circuit riding, Chase continued to press the
issue. First, he argued that if the midnight judges still held their offices,
there were no vacant circuit positions for the justices to occupy in the first
place.59 Second, he noted that riding circuit would effectively displace the
circuit judges; if the repeal really were unconstitutional, agreeing to do so
would make the justices complicit in a wrongful act.60 Chase only got
around to answering Marshall in his third point, stating that, because
riding circuit allowed the Justices to exercise original jurisdiction beyond
the narrow scope of Article III, the practice was indeed unconstitutional. '
Chase's full-throated argument met largely with silence, eliciting just a
brief rejoinder from Justice William Cushing:
As to being instrumental (by taking the Circuits) in violating the
rights of the Judges & the Constitution, I do not see that it carries
that inference. It is not in our power to restore to them their
Salaries or them to the exercise of their Offices. Declining the
Circuits will have no tendency to do either. . .. Suppose we apply
or represent or remonstrate to the President; what can he say?
"Gent There is the Law I cannot control Congress." And you & I
know We cannot control the Majority.62
Cushing's fatalism suggests that the Court had little appetite for
controversy, especially concerning the midnight judges. The fact that the
other justices failed to respond at all-at least in the extant
correspondence-bolsters this interpretation. By early summer, the clear
consensus among the Justices was to ride circuit.63
Marshall did not respond to Chase (or if he did, the letter does not
survive), so his personal opinion on the repeal remains uncertain. There
are some faint indications that the Chief Justice agreed with Chase in
principle, even if he did not want to say so in writing. Around the time he
wrote to the Court about circuit riding, Marshall met with Representative
James Bayard, the son-in-law of midnight judge Richard Bassett and the
leader of the opposition to the repeal in the House. Afterwards, Bayard
wrote to Bassett, telling him the judges should prepare to suspend their
government of the United States . .. will certainly cease to deserve [to be called one of laws and not
men], if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
59. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
supra note 51, at 113-14.
60. Id. at 114 ("If one person exercises an office, to which another has legal title he is a wrong-
doer. Shall a Judge be a wrong-docr?").
61. Id. at 114-15.
62. Letter from Hannah Cushing to Abigail Adams (June 25, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
supra note 51, at 116 n.5 (excerpting William Cushing's reply to Samuel Chase).
63. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF
MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 117; Letter from William Paterson to John Marshall (June 18, 1802), in
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courts once the repeal became effective.' Bayard also wrote to Alexander
Hamilton, revealing that Marshall "considers the late repealing act as
operative in depriving the [circuit] Judges of all power. . . . [T]he most
advisable course for the Circuit courts to pursue will be at the end of their
ensuing Session to adjourn generally, & to leave what remains to be done
to the Supreme Court."65 Note that Bayard only stated that Marshall
thought the repeal deprived the circuit judges of all powers, leaving open
the possibility that the repeal had not affected the judges' commissions
and salaries. Indeed, Marshall's biographer maintained that, like Chase,
Marshall "held firmly to the opinion that in so far as the Republican
Judiciary Repeal Act of 1802 deprived National judges of their offices
and salaries, that legislation was unconstitutional."6 6
Regardless, from Chase's perspective the entire process must have been
deeply unsatisfying. The question that had convulsed Congress in early
1802 was not the constitutionality of circuit riding, but the
constitutionality of ousting the midnight judges. Yet the justices'
correspondence seemed to convey just the opposite. Unhappily, Chase fell
into line, "sink[ing]," as he earlier put it, "under the burthen of deciding
so momentous a question." 67
As a result of these deliberations, the justices took to the circuits in
1802 and later convened in Washington in February 1803 for their
rescheduled term. Two weeks later, Chief Justice Marshall handed down
his celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison, acknowledging Marbury's
right to his commission before dismissing the case because the statute
conferring jurisdiction was unconstitutional.6 8 In one sense, Marbury gave
notice that the Supreme Court would not completely defer to the
Republicans, but such ringing proclamations of judicial authority must be
measured against the Court's jurisdictional holding, which defused the
potential for any real confrontation between the branches.
Indeed, when viewed alongside a lesser-known case called Stuart v.
64. Letter from James Bayard (Apr. 24, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Bayard
Papers). Although the letter is unaddressed, the contents clearly show Bassett was the intended
recipient.
65. Letter from James Bayard to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 25, 1802), in 25 PAPERS OF
HAMILTON, supra note 44, at 614; see also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Charles Pinckney
(Apr. 25, 1802), in I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 224-25
(1922) ("The office still remains, which [Marshall] holds to be a mere capacity ... to receive and
exercise any new judicial powers which the Legislature may confer.").
66. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 122.
67. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
supra note 51, at 116. Chase may have held out hope for a meeting of the judges even after the
disappointing exchange of letters. See ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 344 n. 16 (quoting a letter from
Benjamin Stoddert to Judge Oliver Wolcott stating that Chase still expected a meeting "before the
New Law" goes into operation).
68. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 181-82.
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Laird,69 Marbury looks less like a show of strength and more like another
in a string of concessions stretching back to the circuit riding question.
Stuart was one of several challenges by Federalist attorneys in circuit
courts ranging from Virginia to Massachusetts on the eve of the 1802
elections. Each arose out of cases that had been pending in the circuits at
the time of the 1801 Act's repeal and were transferred to the restored
courts when the 1801 Act was abolished." All the challenges advanced
two distinct claims: (1) the Repeal Act unconstitutionally divested federal
judges of tenure, so the transfer was void and the case should be heard in
the original court; (2) Supreme Court justices could not constitutionally
exercise original jurisdiction under the 1789 circuit-riding model, so the
current court could not hear the case. Republicans denounced these legal
maneuvers as pure sophistry. A Boston newspaper remarked that the plan
"could have originated only in the head of some crack'd brained Lawyer,
or some broken down despairing political quack," and characterized it as
"the last effort of expiring Federalism in support of their midnight
Judiciary."72
In each case, the Federalists ultimately withdrew their objections, save
one: Stuart v. Laird, where Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit judge
in Virginia, overruled the plea and thus set up an appeal to the Supreme
Court.73 As Bruce Ackerman has shown, Marbury provided an easy
roadmap if the Court wished to declare circuit riding unconstitutional.
Marbury's core holding was that Congress could not expand the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction from the enumerated cases in Article III.7
Under that logic, if the Justices exercised such original jurisdiction while
riding circuit, and if they did not hold separate commissions as lower
federal judges (who could be granted more extensive original
jurisdiction), then the practice was clearly unconstitutional. 7s But the
Court declined to take this route. Uncharacteristically, Chief Justice
Marshall recused himself and assigned William Paterson to write for the
Court." In a terse opinion, Justice Paterson resolved the case on narrow
grounds. He first held that Congress had broad power to transfer suits
69. 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803); ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 181-82.
70. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 9, 2 Stat. 156, 163 (transferring cases pending at the time of
repeal to the reconstituted pre-1801 Act courts); Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 4, 2 Stat. at 132 (same).
71. See Holt, supra note 11, at 17.
72. "Veritas," INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1802, at 2. The Federalist press gave the litigation only
limited coverage. See, e.g., A Noble Stand in Favor of the Constitution, TRENTON FEDERALIST, Oct.
18, 1802, at 3.
73. Holt, supra note I1, at 17-18.
74. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 174.
75. ACKERMAN, supra note I1, at 183-84.
76. Ackerman hypothesizes that Marshall withdrew because he could not stomach writing an
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from one court to another and had indisputably done so here; as such,
there was no need to reach the question of the constitutionality of
abolishing the midnight judges' offices.7 ' Next, because the Justices
"acquiesced" in riding circuit under the original Judiciary Act for ten
years, Paterson concluded the Court was bound by precedent-"the
question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.""
III.
Stuart was hardly the ideal vehicle to challenge the repeal of the
Judiciary Act.79 As Justice Patterson noted, whether Congress could
transfer cases between courts and whether Congress could abolish the
office of a sitting judge were two separate issues. Although a creative
judge could undoubtedly reach the second issue if he really wanted to,
Stuart's "implication was clear enough: If the circuit judges wished to
protest about their treatment under the [Repeal Act], they would have to.
bring a different lawsuit."so All of this raises an obvious question-why
didn't the midnight judges follow Marbury or Stuart's lead and sue to
recover their jobs? According to some scholars, they actually did. For
instance, Bruce Ackerman points to a "little-known case" in which "one
of the deposed circuit judges, Joseph Reed, did indeed bring an action ...
to federal court" before dropping the lawsuit.' This certainly sounds
promising, but for one fact: Joseph Reed was not a federal judge.
All of the claims about Reed trace back to an erroneous statement from
Charles Warren in which he interprets a newspaper article about a case in
New Jersey called Reed v. Prudden.2 Edward Harnett has observed that
since the case to which Warren referred "was brought . . . after the
adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1801, but before its repeal," it is
"dubious" to conclude that Reed was a suit by a midnight judge to have
77. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299, 308-09 (1803).
78. Id. at 309.
79. See Weinberg, supra note 55, at 1282-83 ("The midnight circuit judges were even less a
feature of Laird than of Marbury.").
80. ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 185.
81. Id. at 179-80; see also CURRIE, supra note 35, at 20 ("One of the judges went to court, but it
was not clear he had a right to sue.") (citations omitted); LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 120 (2004) ("[S]ome of the removed
Federalist judges challenged ... the repeal in four lower court cases."); Holt, supra note 11, at 73 n.61
("One of Adams's 'midnight' appointees ... Jacob Read . . . instituted suit (under the style Read v.
Prudden) in the federal circuit court in New Jersey.").
82. 1 WARREN, supra note 65, at 272 n.1. Warren cites three versions of the article-
Constitutional Question, WASH. FEDERALIST (D.C.), May 23, 1803, at 3; Constitutional Question,
CHARLESTON COURIER (S.C.), May 9, 1803, at 3; and Constitutional Question, NEW-ENGLAND
PALLADIUM (Bos., Mass.), Apr. 19, 1803, at 2-that are identical except for minor typographical
differences. Another instance that Warren does not cite appears at Constitutional Question,
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE (R.I.), Apr. 23, 1803, at 2.
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his office restored. More to the point, a different version of the article
cited by Warren, printed in the Gazette of the United States, conclusively
proves that Warren simply misread his source, confusing an independent
legal challenge with a case initiated by a midnight judge. 8 4
The expanded article shows Reed was a private citizen, the
administrator for the estate of a Mr. Thomas Bartow. He first appeared
before Judges Tilghman, Griffith, and Bassett on October 2, 1801, over a
$525 debt dispute with a Mr. Joseph Prudden." Prudden, the defendant,
was granted an extension until the following May, and then again until
October.86 When the parties returned in October 1802, they found a very
different court than a year earlier. Instead of Judges Tilghman, Griffith,
and Basset, Justice William Paterson and District Judge Robert Morris
now presided under the old circuit-riding system. It was actually Prudden,
not Reed, who decided to contest the constitutionality of the repeal. His
argument, though quite convoluted in print, was relatively
straightforward. First, Tilghman, Bassett, and Griffith were duly
appointed circuit judges. Second, because they had not been impeached,
they retained a vested interest in their offices. Third, William Paterson
and Robert Morris were not commissioned as circuit judges, but as judges
of the Supreme and District Courts, respectively. Consequently,
Prudden's attorney argued, Patterson and Morris "ought not to have
cognizance of the plea aforesaid: but the same ought of right and
according to the laws . . . to be had and prosecuted before the Honourable
William Tilghman, Richard Bassett, and William Griffith.""
If the form of this argument sounds familiar, it is, because Reed was
part and parcel of the same Federalist litigation strategy as Stuart v.
Laird.8 After introducing the Reed case, Ackerman wonders: "Why
didn't Reed and his fellow judges push their lawsuit all the way to the
Supreme Court? How could they have failed to see that their case
provided a better vehicle for the Court than either Marbury or Stuart?"89
Of course, once Reed is seen for what it really is-Stuart by another
name-this conundrum falls away. Nevertheless, Ackerman is right to ask
why the midnight judges' response unfolded the way that it did. It is to
83. See Edward Hartnett, Not the King's Bench, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 298-99 n.55 (2003-04).
84. See Constitutional Question, GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), Apr. 9, 1803, at 2. The piecc was
reprinted in Constitutional Question, SPECTATOR (N.Y.), Apr. 20, 1 803, at 2; Constitutional Question,
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Apr. 19, 1803, at 2.
85. Minutes of the U.S. Circuit Court (Apr. 2, 1790-Apr. 15, 1879), Record Group 21, T-928,
Roll 1, Records of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey and Predecessor Courts,
1790-1950 (on file with the Nat'l Archives, N.Y.C.).
86. See Constitutional Question, GAZETTE U.S., Apr. 9, 1803, at 2.
87. Id. (emphasis omitted).
88. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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that question that I now turn.
IV
Go back now to March 1802, just after the repeal of the Judiciary Act.
The midnight judges, like most observers, had expected repeal for several
months." Once it became a reality, William Tilghman, the chief judge of
the Third Circuit, seized the initiative and wrote to the other judges on
behalf of himself and his colleagues:
The act of the last session of Congress repealing the law under
which we hold our offices has filled our mind with the most
serious reflections. Thinking as we do, that the repealing law is a
violation of the constitution, we feel ourselves impelled by sacred
obligations, to take the legal measures for-disputing its validity.
How to bring this important subject to a constitutional decision,
with the least possible interruption of the public. conscience and
tranquility; and how, in the meantime to conduct ourselves with
the greatest propriety, are questions which require sure and mature
deliberation. It appears to us that they cannot well be answered
without a personal communication of sentiments between the
Judges of the different circuits. . . . Under these impressions, we
have thought it advisable, to request a general meeting of the
Circuit Judges in the city of Philadelphia, on Saturday the 17th of
July next.91
Not all of the judges responded to Tilghman's inquiry. The venerable
John Lowell had passed away earlier in the month, although Judge
Benjamin Bourne assured Tilghman of Lowell's opposition to the
repeal.92 William McClung of the Sixth Circuit probably lived too far
from Philadelphia to make an invitation practical. Finally, Jefferson's
Fifth Circuit nominations, Henry Potter and Dominic Hall, either refused
to participate or, more likely, were not contacted; in any event, they could
expect the current Administration to watch out for them.9 3
90. See Letter from William Tilghman to Harriet Tilghman (Nov. 14, 1801) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers); Letter from Oliver Wolcott to James Watson (Feb. 16,
1802) (on file with Conn. Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
91. Letter from William Tilghman to Oliver Wolcott (May 22, 1802) (on file with Conn.
Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers). An identical letter, addressed to Judge Jeremiah Smith,
is printed in JOHN HOPKINS MORISON, LIFE OF THE HON. JEREMIAH SMITH 148-49 (Little & Brown
1845).
92. See Letter from Benjamin Boume to William Tilghman (June 12, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
93. Potter was soon named to the United States District Court of North Carolina, replacing Judge
Sitgreaves, whose own refusal to accept a circuit position allowed Potter to become a circuit judge in
the first place. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (describing Potter's appointment to the
Fifth Circuit); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Senate (Apr. 6, 1802), in 37 PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 187 (naming Potter to replace Sitgreaves on the district court). And, if
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The remaining midnight judges responded enthusiastically to
Tilghman's letter. George Taylor hoped that together the judges might
"prove the mistake of those who assert that written constitutions are
feeble barriers when opposed to the rage of party or the passions of the
people."94 Egbert Benson agreed, informing Tilghman that he and his
fellow judges for the Second Circuit "would readily conform themselves
to whatever the Gentlemen who may assemble shall recommend."9 5
Jeremiah Smith, Benjamin Bourne, Philip Key, and Charles Magill also
could not attend, but they promised to support any plan that might emerge
from Philadelphia.96 At the same time, more sobering realities belied the
judges' enthusiasm. Even if the judges had a legal right to their salaries,
litigating the issue would be difficult and time-consuming. Several of the
men had already begun looking for more stable employment. Jeremiah
Smith moved quickly to accept a position as chief justice of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in May.97 Charles Magill revealed that he had
returned to private practice.98 Oliver Wolcott, already in economic
difficulties prior to his appointment to the bench, entered into serious
discussions to oversee a copper mine in New Jersey as early as February
1802, before the Repeal Act had even passed the House.9 9
Curiously-and, to my knowledge, unremarked on to date-word
managed to get out about the July meeting around this time. Daniel
D'Oyley, a Republican bureaucrat from South Carolina, somehow found
that complicated dance were not enough, Jefferson then nominated Edward Harris to replace Potter on
the Fifth Circuit, despite the fact that the court would be abolished in less than three months. See
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to the Senate (Apr. 27, 1802), in 37 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25,
at 348. Dominic Hall eventually received a judgeship of his own on the District Court of Orleans, the
predecessor to the District Court of Louisiana. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 475-76
(1804).
94. Letter from George Taylor to William Tilghman (June 7, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
95. Letter from Egbert Benson to William Tilghman (June 10, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
96. Letter from Benjamin Boume to William Tilghman (June 12, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers); Letter from Philip Key to William Tilghman, n.d. (on file
with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers) (writing before the first meeting in light of its
content); Letter from Charles Magill to William Tilghman (July 10, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers); Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Tilghman (June 7, 1802) (on
file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
97. MORISON, supra note 91, at 150; Letter from Jeremiah Smith to John Lowell (Mar. 25, 1802)
(on file with Houghton Library, Harvard Univ., Lowell Family Papers) (declining to travel to the
circuit sessions in Providence and Boston). Despite taking the New Hampshire position, Smith
refused to resign from the federal bench, preferring to remain "a circuit judge de jure" though
"ceas[ing] to be a judge defacto." MORISON, supra note 91, at 152.
98. Letter from Charles Magill to William Tilghman (July 10, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers) ("Having resumed the practice of law my professional avocations
occasioned my absence from this place for the three weeks preceding the above date.").
99. Letter from Oliver Wolcott to James Watson (Feb. 16, 1802) (on file with Conn. Historical
Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
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out about the judges' plans and dashed off a barely legible letter to Albert
Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. "I know it to be the intention of
the circuit judges of the U.S. to meet at Philadelphia on the 17th July,"
D'Oyley wrote. 00 He suspected that the judges would ask the Supreme
Court to rule on the constitutionality of the repeal: "The federalists
doubtless will support them by any means and the present state of affairs
cannot discourage their hopes to introduce confusion or what may be
worse . . . a dissolution of the government."' 0 ' One wonders exactly how
this information, accurate to the day, could have reached D'Oyley,
especially since the circuit judge in South Carolina (Dominic Hall) was a
Jefferson nominee. And although D'Oyley may have just been an
overeager partisan, the fact that he took the meeting so seriously is
striking.
Before D'Oyley's fears could materialize, however, the judges had to
figure out how to bring their case in the first place. Jurisdictional and
common law vagaries combined to make direct judicial review of the
midnight judges' claims quite difficult. Unlike William Marbury, the
judges could not file for a writ of mandamus, a tool to force government
officials to perform a nondiscretionary, ministerial act. Marbury sought
the delivery of his commission, which he claimed had vested upon
Adams' signature.'02 By contrast, the midnight judges already had their
commissions; indeed they had performed their duties throughout 1801.
The issue, then, was not whether the judges' commissions to their offices
had vested. It was whether the Repeal Act rendered the commissions null
and void by abolishing the offices entirely, and here mandamus was no
use. It would also be difficult for the judges to sue for their salaries
directly. The background norm in the early Republic was that only the
legislature could appropriate funds from the Treasury.'o3 During this
period, money claims against the United States were generally referred to
a special House Committee on Claims for consideration, with the courts
playing no significant role.'04 Thus, unless the judges thought that the
100. Letter from Daniel D'Oyley to Albert Gallatin (June 22, 1802), microformed on The Papers
of Albert Gallatin, Reel 7-253 (Rhistoric Pub'ns).
101. Id.
102. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, When an Appointment Vests (U. Va. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 2012-16, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008396.
103. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1872-74 (2010);
Floyd D. Shimomura, History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative
Toward a Judicial Mode ofPayment, 45 LA. L. REv. 625, 637-43 (1985).
104. Shimomura, supra note 103, at 643-47; see also 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 73 (1803) (statement
of Sen. Nicholas) (arguing that, if the office of circuit judge exists, "instead of sending [the judges] to
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Republican Congress would agree to pay them a regular salary after
abolishing their courts, they would need another strategy.
Unfortunately, very few of the replies provided anything like specific
proposals. Samuel Hitchcock remarked on the difficulty in "bring[ing] the
subject before the proper tribunal."os Benjamin Bourne wrote to
Tilghman in June expressing surprise that the judges were preparing for
"active measures." 06 His circuit "supposed it would rest with the Judges
of the Supreme Court to decide on the validity of the [R]epealing Act &
that probably they would determine (informally) this question prior to the
period fixed for the revived circuit courts."o' And, in the clearest sign of
the judges' difficulties, William Griffith plaintively told Tilghman, "You
must turn it in your mind-what we are to do at this meeting. As we have
proposed it, no doubt the Gentlemen if they accede to the invitation will
suspect from us some project: I have none, not even an Idea."' 08
Ironically, Oliver Wolcott, who had little formal legal experience before
being elevated to the bench in 1801, wrote the most extensive reply by
far. His letter contained a detailed memorandum laying out the
constitutional case against the repeal. 09 Back in March, Wolcott had
assured Representative Roger Griswold of his intent to, "in some form,
record my opinion respecting the act for abolishing the Circuit Courts."" 0
However, Wolcott did not take immediate action because he recognized
that the real initiative lay with the Supreme Court."' Now, the receipt of
Tilghman's letter spurred Wolcott to develop a full indictment of the
repeal. Where the other judges' replies had simply asserted the repeal's
unconstitutionality without much argument, Wolcott undertook a
sophisticated reading of constitutional text and structure. Although the
legal basis against the repeal had been fleshed out during the
Congressional debates, this was the first time a circuit judge had
articulated the case so directly.
The Constitution, Wolcott wrote, "definitively stated" how officials
105. Letter from Samuel Hitchcock to William Tilghman (July 6, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers); see also Letter from George Taylor to William Tilghman
(June 7, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers) (noting the "considerable
difficulties" in submitting the question to a constitutional decision).
106. Letter from Benjamin Bourne to William Tilghman (June 12, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
107. Id.
108. Letter from William Griffith to William Tilghman (June 16, 1802) (on file with Historical
Soc'y of Pa., William Tilghman Papers) (emphasis omitted).
109. See Letter from Oliver Wolcott to William Tilghman (June 25, 1802) (on file with Conn.
Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers). This version is a very rough draft, so making out its
folds, strikethroughs, and scribbles is difficult.
110. Letter from Oliver Wolcott to Roger Griswold (Mar. 23, 1802) (on file with Conn.
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were to be appointed to each of the branches of government-
representatives and senators were chosen by the people and state
legislatures, respectively; the president by the electoral college; and
judges by the president, with the Senate's advice and consent-and what
their terms of tenure would be. By implication, Wolcott reasoned that "the
Electors of the constituent branches can in no case, revoke appointments
which they have once made."1 l2  Furthermore, the Constitution
"authorized distinct provisions for securing a due compensation."l13
Wolcott declared it his "most decided conviction, that the Act . . .
abolishing the Circuit courts, is repugnant to these principles" and would
"reduce[] the Judiciary to a subordinate grade, dependent on the will of
Congress and the President.""l 4
As he saw it, moreover, the Republicans' unrestrained conception of
majority rule did not just put the federal judiciary at risk. The executive
could easily become "a passive instrument of the ambition & passions of
the Legislature," and the aristocratic Senate might similarly succumb to
the more populist House."' Furthermore, the States might follow the
federal lead and undermine judicial independence in their own
governments. Wolcott foresaw corruption of the rule of law and civic
decline throughout the Union."16 Concurrent attacks on the Federalist-
dominated judiciary in Maryland showed these fears of widespread
partisanship were not totally unfounded."'
Wolcott reiterated what he had told Roger Griswold in March-that the
initiative lay with the justices of the Supreme Court. But whatever the
Court decided, he still felt the judges were obliged to speak out:
[T]he Circuit Judges, though oppressed by power & deprived of
the means of exercising their functions, can declare and publish
their opinions-of this recourse they cannot be divided, and in my
judgment they are bound to exert it; that it may appear, that they
are not responsible, for the consequence of a passive surrender of
the public rights constitutionally committed to them." 8
112. Id.
113. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (Congressional pay) (later modified by the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (Executive pay); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. I
(Judicial pay).
114. Letter from Oliver Wolcott to William Tilghman (June 25, 1802) (on file with Conn.
Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Letter from Oliver Wolcott to William DePaulson[?] (Mar. 25, 1802) (on file
with Conn. Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers) ("A precedent is established which endangers
all our State Judicial Establishments.").
117. See Jed Shugerman, Marbury and Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whittington v. Polk
and the Maryland Judicial Battle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 58, 65-73 (2002).
118. Letter from Oliver Wolcott to William Tilghman (June 25, 1802) (on file with Conn.
Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
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For Wolcott, moreover, this tactic was essentially majoritarian: "The
Judges claim no exemption from responsibility to the People; to the will
of the Nation, they are willing to submit. They merely claim, to be
independent of the power or influence of the Legislative & Executive
Departments in the expressions of judicial opinions."ll 9
The meaning of Wolcott's memorandum shifts, however, when one
recalls that just a few weeks earlier, the Supreme Court decided it would
indeed ride circuit again, effectively ousting the midnight judges.12 0 This
meant Wolcott's call for an independent judiciary to rise to the occasion
and vindicate basic constitutional principles was stillborn, although he did
not know it at the time. Indeed, it is curious that the Justices did not think
to communicate their intentions to the midnight judges, especially since
they had at least two clear opportunities. First, Justice Bushrod
Washington corresponded with Egbert Benson in March, shortly before
Bushrod told John Marshall the circuit riding question "ought to be
considered as settled."' 2 ' However, in his June 10 letter to Tilghman,
Benson showed no awareness that the Court had even broached the issue.
Second, Marshall apparently received his copy of the Judiciary Act of
1802, from which he learned of the incipient cancellation of the Supreme
Court's June term, from none other than Oliver Wolcott.12 2 One day after
Marshall thanked Wolcott for sending the copy, the Chief Justice wrote
Paterson of his "strong constitutional scruples" about circuit riding, but
Marshall's letter to Wolcott said nothing about the repeal. 2 3 Instead,
Marshall expressed gratitude for the material because he "was entirely
uncertain what destiny would be decreed us"-as if the circuit judges
were not waiting on the Supreme Court to see what destiny would be
decreed for themselves! 2 4
The judges only learned of the Court's stance through a remarkable
encounter on the eve of the Philadelphia meeting. Judge Philip Key, one
119. Id. (emphasis omitted).
120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
121. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF
MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 117-18 (paraphrasing Bushrod Washington's letter from "a few days
past" and telling Paterson that Washington denied an "application" by Judge Benson to examine some
papers George Washington bequeathed to his nephew in 1799). Benson was evidently displeased that
Washington refused him access. See Letter from Bushrod Washington to Oliver Wolcott (Mar. 21,
1804) (on file with N.Y. Historical Soc'y, Rufus King Papers).
122. In faimess, there is some uncertainty as to whether Wolcott was the recipient of this letter
because the cover page has gone missing. Scholars attribute it on the basis of the original being held
in the Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers. See 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 105 a. 1.
123. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 6, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
supra note 51, at 106; Letter from John Marshall to Oliver Wolcott (Apr. 5, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF
MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 104.
124. Letter from John Marshall to Oliver Wolcott (Apr. 5, 1802), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
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of the more controversial midnight nominees because he had fought for
the Loyalists in the Revolutionary War, owed his successful confirmation
in part to an influential backer: Samuel Chase.12 5 On his way to
Philadelphia in July, Key paid Chase a visit. Considering the
circumstances, the conversation must have been fascinating.
Unfortunately, the written account is quite sparse, but, having escaped
notice up to now, still deeply illuminating:
Mr. Chase informs us that the Judges of the Supreme Court have
determined to go forward to the discharge of the duties imposed
on them by the late Congress-that Congress was Competent to
enlarge, diminish or annul our Judicial duties-and I understand
(tho no opinion is given on the subject) that our Commissions and
the right to our Salaries remain as before-this opinion formed by
all the Judges renders inefficacious any attempt to support any
exercise of Judicial Power vested in us by the Act under which we
derive our Appointments. 12 6
Key's "understanding" from Chase that the midnight judges'
commissions and salaries were unaffected by the repeal is worth noting,
as none of the other justices raised the issue in their correspondence.
Recall that only Justice Cushing responded to Chase's argument about
ousting the midnight judges, and he merely stated that he did not think the
Court had the "power" to restore the judges' offices or salaries. 12 7 Note
also that, if Key could be believed, the legal challenge that would be
advanced in Stuart v. Laird was dead on arrival. If the Court truly thought
Congress was "competent to enlarge, diminish or annul" the judges'
duties, it is hard to see why Congress could not transfer all pending cases
from the 1801 Act courts into the old system. And while the judges might
nonetheless retain a right to their salaries, Stuart did not directly raise that
issue.
The judges could not easily bring the salary question to court, at least
not directly. 128 However, Key proposed a scheme to get around this
problem:
Perhaps being duly appointed and commissioned duties of a
Judicial matter attach to us in principles of Co. Law, & so, the
exercise of those duties, may be drawn into examination before the
Supreme Court, and in that mode the Judges may declare that our
Commissions remain as to all such duties, and of course our
125. Turner, supra note 9, at 513.
126. Letter from Philip Key to William Tilghman (July 19, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
127. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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In other words, while Congress was competent to strip the circuit
judges of all statutory duties, Key and the others might retain residual
common law powers simply by virtue of their commissions. In testing this
theory, the judges could permit the Court to pronounce on the repeal and,
in the process, establish the judges' continuing right to their salaries.
It is admittedly difficult to understand exactly what Key had in mind
here. The Judiciary Act of 1801 not only established the circuit courts, it
defined their jurisdiction, empowered the judges to issue certain writs and
empanel juries, appointed clerks and marshals, and specified where court
records should be kept.130 All of these detailed specifications had now
been repealed. Moreover, the Constitution was notably silent on the
powers of federal judges, especially lower federal judges, whose very
existence it left entirely in the hands of Congress.'3 ' Hence, a signed
commission by itself was a thin reed on which to base the exercise of
judicial powers. Just as a practical matter, it would be difficult to test
Key's theory that common law norms conferred freestanding authority on
the holders of judicial commissions. Most probably, any attempt to
perform a judicial act would simply be ignored. As one Republican
congressman put it, "[I]f these men think they still hold their offices, . . . .
[1]et them take their seat upon the bench and see if the Marshal will obey
them. Let them attempt to send a man to the whipping-post, or to jail, and
I believe they will find out whether they are judges or not."l 3 2
It is true that the Federalists were capable of bringing test cases to
defend constitutional principles. This is essentially what they did in Stuart
v. Laird."' But even if Key could have found putative litigants or a
marshal willing to take part in his scheme, his reliance on the common
law posed further problems. In the early Republic, it was a live question
whether there was a federal common law to begin with.'34 Republicans
129. Letter from Philip Key to William Tilghman (July 19, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers) (emphasis added). After much squinting, I am confident that the
mark I have indicated as "Co." is an abbreviation of "common law," although here, as elsewhere, the
judges' messy scrawls do not allow for complete certainty.
130. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
132. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 65 (1803) (statement of Sen. Jackson).
133. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury
Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607 (2001)
(arguing that Marbury purposefully chose his forum to give Marshall a vehicle to establish judicial
review); James M. O'Fallon, The Case ofBenjamin More: A Lost Episode in the Struggle over Repeal
of the 1801 Judiciary Act, II LAW & HIST. REV. 43, 52 (1993) (suggesting that another legal
challenge arising out of the repeal may have been a test case).
134. See Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common
Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223 (1986); Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of
Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
campaigned on widespread distrust of federal common law in connection
with the hated Sedition Act.135 Some of the Republican hostility toward
the Judiciary Act of 1801 involved suspicions about federal common law,
as well.136 Moreover, although many Federalists were sympathetic to the
idea of federal criminal common law jurisdiction, the judges' foremost
ally on the Court, Justice Chase, had openly rejected it.' If the common
law could not confer jurisdiction on federal judges in duly authorized
courts, it seems yet a further step to say it can confer powers on a judge
with no statutory authority whatsoever.
Whatever the particulars of Key's plan, it would surely have been
enormously controversial. Unfortunately, none of the circuit judges
expressed any recorded opinion about the idea, so it remains a tantalizing
counterfactual. However, Key's July letter also included a second
proposal. "If no other mode is devised of having a Judicial decision of our
rights," he suggested, "would not a temperate dignified remonstrance to
Congress, with a tender of our Services, and a demand of our salaries, be
correct?"138 This warranted skepticism, as it called for the judges to
petition the very same legislature that had abolished their courts and
salaries only a few months before. However, unlike the courts, Congress
clearly had the power, if not the political will, to assign the judges new
duties and to pay their salaries.
Key's letter probably deflated the Philadelphia meeting, which was not
well attended anyway (Egbert Benson was the only judge outside of the
Third Circuit to actually make the trip). Since the Supreme Court's
decision to ride circuit threw whatever plan existed into disarray, the
judges decided to hold another gathering. In August, Tilghman sent out
notices to the circuit judges that had not made the July meeting:
We were convinced, by satisfactory information, that the Judges of
the Supreme Court had determined to hold their Circuits under the
Act of the last session of Congress. To that decision we are bound
to submit. But it was our opinion, that altho precluded from
holding Courts, yet our Commissions as Judges, & our right to
receive the compensations fixed by law, remained in full force and
135. Federalists in part defended the Sedition Act as merely altering powers already granted to
the federal courts by the common law, thus prompting the Republicans to deny the existence of any
such common law authority in the first place. See Rowe, supra note 134, at 936-41.
136. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Origins ofFederal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003,
1093-1111 (1985).
137. United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798); see also Stephen D. Presser, A Tale
of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence,
73 Nw. U. L. REv. 26, 58-62 (1978). The Supreme Court would eventually reject federal criminal
common law jurisdiction in the case of United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
138. Letter from Philip Key to William Tilghman (July 19, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
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in this sentiment we were confirmed, by the opinion of men of
great Abilities, in various parts of the Union.' 9
Tilghman did not mention Key's common law plan at all. Instead, he
endorsed the more moderate route, writing that "the prevailing Idea, at the
meeting, seemed to be, that the subject would be most properly brought
forward, by a memorial to Congress, at the next Session."l4 0 Stressing the
importance of unanimity once more, Tilghman requested that the judges
attend a second gathering in November.14 '
Just one day after Tilghman called for a second meeting in
Philadelphia, the city's major Federalist newspaper, the Gazette of the
United States, suspended its normal slate of articles and gave over nearly
the entirety of its issue to an article entitled Judge Bassett's Protest.42
The gist of the argument was familiar: the Constitution had vested distinct
powers in three coequal departments of government and fixed the modes
of selection and terms of office; judges plainly holding office under good
behavior could not be removed unless convicted of misbehavior; the
circuit judges were still in rightful possession of their commissions; the
justices should refuse to obey the repealing laws; and Congress ought to
make provisions by law for the continuance of the judges' courts and
duties. Editors all over the country republished the story in their own
papers, where it received a great deal of attention. 4 3
Scholarly opinion has divided over the document's true authorship,
with some, including many contemporary Republican partisans,
attributing the piece to James Bayard, Bassett's son-in-law. 4 4 However, it
seems extremely unlikely that Bassett and the other judges who met in
late July would not have weighed in on the impending publication. The
Protest's concluding section, taken at face value, suggested as much. "If
139. See Letter from William Tilghman to Oliver Wolcott (Aug. 26, 1802) (on file with Conn.
Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers); Letter from William Tilghman to Benjamin Bourne
(Aug. 20, 1802) (on file with Historical Soc'y of Pa., Society Collection).
140. Letter from William Tilghman to Oliver Wolcott (Aug. 26, 1802) (on file with Conn.
Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
141. The judges evidently felt some sense of urgency, because they scheduled the second
meeting for the earliest possible date which Key stated he could attend. See Letter from Philip Key to
William Tilghman (July 28, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers). As it
happened, Key was unable to attend regardless. Letter from Philip Key to William Tilghman (Dec. 4,
1802) (on file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
142. GAZETTE U.S., Aug. 21, 1802. A copy-omitting several introductory paragraphs-is
helpfully provided in an appendix to ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 276-79.
143. The essay was also republished in pamphlet form as THE PROTEST OF THE HON. RICHARD
BASSETT... AGAINST TWo ACTS OF CONGRESS OF THE 8TH OF MARCH AND 29TH OF APRIL 1802
(Phila., Bronson & Chauncey 1802).
144. See, e.g., MORTON BORDEN, THE FEDERALISM OF JAMES BAYARD 226 (1954) (observing
that Bassett's arguments closely track some of Bayard's in the House); COLUMBIAN ADVERTISER
(Alexandria, Va.), Aug. 25, 1802, at 3; PROVIDENCE PHOENIX (RI.), Sept. 7, 1802, at 2; SALEM
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any difference of opinion, between me and my associates in office,
exists," it read, "it relates merely to the point of time for expressing our
sentiments. I can confidently assert, that on deliberation, they coincide
with me in other respects." 4 5 Indeed, the obvious source for much of the
Protest was the judges themselves. In January, before the Repeal Act had
officially been introduced, Judge William Griffith, Basset's colleague
along with William Tilghman, had asked Tilghman to publish his
opposition, "which tho' ineffectual at this time may years to come, carry
to the bosoms of the unthinking . . . the conviction that a cheap
government has made a cheap constitution." 46 Bassett might have seen
Wolcott's letter at the July meeting, containing a memorandum on the
repeal and an entreaty for the judges to publish their opinions should the
Court duck the question. Bayard made a similar suggestion to Bassett in
January, too.14 7
Unfortunately, as a persuasive essay, Bassett's Protest fell flat.
Jefferson and his allies remained confident that they would carry the
upcoming midterm elections.'4 8 "Let [Basset and Bayard] not prove the
strength of their party . .. by the points of their bayonets, but test them by
the vote of the people!" declared one paper, "Let registers be opened . . .
in every state, in which the citizens shall inscribe their votes on the
important question." 4 9 Indeed, the Republicans won sweeping gains in
the 1802 elections.
V.
The grim election results overshadowed the judges' upcoming
November meeting, Which produced the finalized draft of the memorial to
Congress. Now a private lawyer in Virginia, Charles Magill informed
Tilghman that he would not attend. Jeremiah Smith, clinging to "a faint
glimmering ray of hope, that the circuit judges will be restored," similarly
declined.' Benjamin Bourne agreed to endorse the planned memorial,
although he entertained "no hope of its meeting a favourable reception or
145. ACKERMAN, supra note I1, at 296 (emphasis omitted).
146. Letter from William Griffith to William Tilghman (Jan. 8, 1802) (on file with Historical
Soc'y of Pa., William Tilghman Papers).
147. Letter from James Bayard to Richard Bassett (Jan. 25, 1802), in in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1913, at 146-47 (1913) ("Why do not those
who are opposed to the [repeal], express in the public papers or by petitions their disapprobation of
the measure? . .. [I]t is likely that a public movement would have great effect.").
148. See ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 177.
149. SALEM REG. (Mass.), Sept. 16, 1802, at 3. For another editorial excoriating Bassett, see
Citizen Bassett's Protest, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston, Mass.), Sept. 6, 1802, at 2-3.
150. MORISON, supra note 91, at 153; Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Tilghman (Nov.
I1, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
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decision." 151 Samuel Hitchcock was flirting with insolvency; in a cruel
twist, he was later called before the new circuit court in Vermont over
unpaid debts, defended by none other than his fellow midnight judge
Egbert Benson.15 2 Wolcott, too, was worn out. "I shall probably attend
[the November meeting]," he told a friend, "but I have no expectation of
advantage to myself or success in respect to public objects. . . . At any
rate, I am tired of Offices and wish as soon as possible to get into a
situation in which I can earn bread for my family."' 53
Despite these personal troubles, Wolcott again rose to the occasion. He
had been thinking about the memorial to congress for at least a month,15 4
and was primarily responsible for the document that emerged from the
November meeting."' The final version struck a conciliatory tone while
concisely expressing the judges' position. It adopted the same posture that
the judges had imputed to the Supreme Court-namely, that although the
law had stripped the judges of their powers, they remained vested in the
office, which meant they could perform judicial duties and had a right to
their salaries.15 6 The judges thus requested that Congress assign them new
duties "consistent with the Constitution and the convenient administration
of justice."' 57 As a practical matter, of course, this was highly unlikely,
since earlier that year Congress had abolished the circuit courts, which it
felt were unnecessary to the administration of justice. As for the judges'
salaries, they offered to "cheerfully . . . submit[] to judicial examination
and decision."' 5 8 This helpful suggestion must of course be viewed
against two background facts: first, that the judges probably could not go
to the courts with their salary claim directly, and second, that their
chances were much better among the judiciary, the only government
151. Letter from Benjamin Bourne to William Tilghman (Nov. 14, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
152. "M.," BEE (Hudson, N.Y.), Dec. 7, 1802, at 3 ("Hitchcock will never question the
constitutionality of the courts under the act of 1802, nor Mr. Benson, who thus relinquishes all
pretensions to the office ofjudge, and appears as counsel at the bar.").
153. Letter from Benjamin Bourne to William Tilghman (Nov. 14, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers); Letter from Oliver Wolcott to James Watson (Oct. 18,
1802) (on file with Conn. Historical Soc'y, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
154. See Letter from George Cabot to Oliver Wolcott (Oct. 21, 1802), in HENRY CABOT LODGE,
LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT 327-28 (Boston, Little, Brown 1877) (giving advice on the
construction of the memorial).
155. Wolcott's papers at the Connecticut Historical Society contain two slightly different
versions of the memorial along with a note: "The preceding Papers, contain the sentiments which I
would have expressed; This paper contains the results of the Conference of the Judges." Draft of the
Circuit Judges' Memorial, n.d. (emphasis omitted) (on file with Conn. Historical Soc'y, Oliver
Wolcott, Jr. Papers).
156. Judges Removed From Office By Legislation (Jan. 28, 1803), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
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branch not dominated by Republicans. The judges' effort, as they
explained it, was the product of "a conviction that they ought not
voluntarily to surrender rights and authorities intrusted [sic] to their
protection, not for their personal advantage, but for the benefit of the
community."s 9
During this time, Philip Key continued to press for more direct action.
In December, he excitedly wrote to Tilghman for information about the
November meeting. Key suggested that, if the judges could not agree on a
plan, "after consulting a few Friends . .. if they approve of it I shall hold
myself ready to do some Judicial Act, that shall bring in to view and
before the Supreme Court, the Question whether my commission is
vacated or not."1 60 However, there is no indication that Key performed
any "judicial act" in the coming months. Tilghman or Key's friends may
have convinced Key otherwise (although there is no documentary
evidence of this), or Key may simply have concluded that he could not
achieve anything acting alone. All that is certain is that the tactic was not
attempted, and Key did not mention it again.
Following the November meeting, the judges hastily circulated copies
of the final draft among themselves. "The earlier in the Session the
Business is brought before Congress the better," Benson urged. 161 He sent
his own and Wolcott's copies to Tilghman and told Tilghman to direct the
three signed memorials to their principal contacts in Congress-James
Ross in the Senate and Roger Griswold in the House-with news that the
more distant copies would follow.'6 2 In mid-December, Tilghman
forwarded the remaining signed copies to Roger Griswold. In a deeply
pessimistic letter, Tilghman admitted that he "entertain[ed] no hope of
present success" but that "it appeared to the Circuit Judges that it was
incumbent on them to place on the record of both houses of Congress,
their considerations & solemn Opinion, that the Act which annihilated the
Exercise of their Judicial functions, without a suggestion of misbehaviour,
was a violation of the Federal Constitution."l 6 3
It took almost two months for the memorials to be presented because
James Ross, the judges' point man in the Senate, did not even arrive in
159. Id.
160. Letter from Philip Key to William Tilghman (Dec. 4, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical
Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
161. Letter from Egbert Benson to William Tilghman (Nov. 27, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
162. Id.
163. Letter from William Tilghman to Roger Griswold (Dec. 5, 1802) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers). Per a notation, the letter was not posted until December
18, 1802. Note that the handwriting in the December letter is especially difficult to make out, perhaps
because it is a draft.
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Washington until January 25.164 On January 27, Ross and Griswold
introduced the memorials in their respective chambers.' The House of
Representatives took up the matter first. James Bayard, who had led the
Federalist opposition to repeal in the House in 1802, was noticeably
passive. He had been narrowly defeated in his re-election bid,166 and now
not even his father-in-law's petition could rouse him. Writing to a friend,
Republican Representative Ebenezer Elmer observed, "Mr. Bayard was
entirely silent on the subject & refused to vote on every question that was
taken.. . . As Bayard has determined to return to a private life, I suppose
he does not wish to irritate any further the Republicans of Delaware." 67
With Bayard sidelined, Wolcott's friend Roger Griswold became the
"principal agitator" for the Federalist cause in the House.'16 Immediately
after Griswold introduced the memorial, the House debated whether to
refer it to the Committee on Claims, which traditionally heard money
claims against the United States, or to the Committee of the Whole, used
when the entire body wished to debate a motion. They ultimately decided
that, although it contained a demand for salary, it fundamentally turned on
constitutional determinations about the Repeal Act that only the whole
House was competent to resolve. To Griswold's great displeasure, the
Republicans then moved to consider the memorials immediately rather
than delaying a day or two to give the House time to consider the
subject.16 9
Put on the spot, Griswold made two resolutions patterned on the judges'
own requests: the first endorsing legislative action to provide new duties
for the circuit judges and the second asking that their compensation
claims be submitted to judicial decision.'7 0 At this point, however, he
seemed to rather inexplicably botch the job. Asked what duties he
proposed to assign to the former judges, Griswold claimed that "he had
not expected to have been called upon to define the plan that would be
most agreeable to him," and lamely suggested that Congress might
"restore the law which the Legislature had, at the last session, attempted
to repeal."'' This was very strange. At some point in early 1803, Egbert
164. S. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1802).
165. H.R. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1802); S. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 257
(1802). The actual memorials, identically worded but in each judge's handwriting, can be found in
SEN7A-G4, Records of the United States Senate, National Archives.
166. See Delaware Election, CENTINEL FREEDOM (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 19, 1802, at 3
(announcing Cesar Rodney's victory over James Bayard by fifteen votes).
167. Letter from Ebenezer Elmer to David Moore (Jan. 27, 1803) (on file with the Library of
Cong., Miscellaneous Manuscripts Collection).
168. Id.
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Benson and Griswold had discussed how Congress might go about
assigning the new duties that the judges requested in the memorial.
Benson went so far as to send Griswold a proposal that Griswold could
use in the congressional debates. Benson wrote to Tilghman that he had
done this
with the view that as [our] Opponents in Congress will doubtless
make every objection, and not improbably go so far as to say there
is no practicable, and at the same time fit, Mode of Reference, that
Mr. G may then in answer to such Objection read the Draft as a
part of his Speech in the Debate, and so it may likewise get into
the public Papers.'7 2
No copy of the draft law survives, but it is clear that Griswold received
the draft before he introduced the memorial to Congress, so why he did
not use it is simply a mystery. 3 Unsurprisingly, the Republicans did not
find the suggestion of restoring the Judiciary Act of 1801 convincing, and
Griswold's first motion was predictably defeated.
Debate on the second motion-a law to provide for judicial resolution
of the judges' salary claims-was more contentious. John Randolph
thought it especially inappropriate to make an exception to the rule that
the United States could not be sued in its own courts because the claim
involved "the interests of judges, as a caste," so a judicial tribunal would
inevitably be biased.'74 But the crux of the problem was that, having just
denied the judges' request for new duties, House Republicans could not
understand why they should pay salaries to men with nothing to do. Both
motions were thus rejected-according to one onlooker, "in a manner not
very respectful""'7 -after just a few hours of debate."'
The odds of success looked slightly better in the Senate, where the
Federalists were able to send the memorial to a special committee,
something their counterparts in the House had failed to do. What was
more, because the Republicans inadvertently split their votes, the
Federalists managed to secure all three committee memberships-James
Ross, Gouverneur Morris, and Jonathan Dayton.' 7  Even so, the
172. Letter from Egbert Benson to William Tilghman (Jan. 27[?], 1803) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
173. Benson's letter states that he had forwarded the proposal to Griswold along with a copy of
the memorial signed by Judge Samuel Hitchcock. Since the House Journal shows that Griswold
submitted Hitchcock's petition on January 27, Griswold must have had the draft law in his possession
on that date as well. See id.; H.R. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1802).
174. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 432 (1803).
175. Letter from James Hillhouse to John Trumbull (Feb. 4, 1803) (on file with Conn. Historical
Soc'y, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. Papers).
176. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (1803).
177. For this chain of events, see Memorial of the Late Judges Before the Senate, UNIVERSAL
GAZETTE (D.C.), Feb. 10, 1803, at 3.
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Republicans held a 17-13 majority in the chamber, and prospects for
defection were slim. While the committee deliberated, the Senate
considered a memorial from William Marbury requesting an attested copy
of the Senate proceedings relating to his appointment as justice of the
peace.'17 The rejection of that petition by a party line vote did not bode
well for the judges.179
Since House Republicans had refused to legislate new duties for the
judges, the Committee came up with another plan, introduced by Morris
on February 3, 1803. Morris proposed that the Senate resolve "[t]hat the
President of the United States be requested to cause an information, in the
nature of quo warranto, to be filed by the Attorney General against
Richard Basset [sic] for the purpose of deciding judicially on their
claims."'s Quo warranto was a common law writ used to force an
officeholder to show on what authority he held his position. Morris'
proposal was unusual enough that he had to clarify to his fellow
congressmen what exactly he was suggesting in the first place. As Morris
explained it, once the attorney general filed the writ, it would be
incumbent on [the judges], either to disclaim the office . . . or else ...
establish their right. And to do this, they must prove two things: first, that
the office exists, and secondly, that of right it belongs to them."'
Republicans advanced three main objections to Morris' plan. First, it
was not clear that a writ of quo warranto was really applicable, since it
was not the judges' authority to hold their positions that was in question,
but whether they held any positions at all.' 82 Indeed, Justice Chase had
already rejected the use of the writ in his letter to Marshall, and Key had
conveyed as much to Tilghman in July.'8 Second, Jefferson almost
certainly would have ignored a Senate resolution requesting he file a writ.
Indeed, many Republicans doubted whether Congress could properly
make such a request to the Executive in the first place.' 84 Third, reliance
on the common law made Republicans extremely suspicious. Senator
William Cocke asked, "If we adopt one form of the common law may not
178. It is notable, considering their divergent historical fates, that one commentator felt that the
debate over the judges' memorial was "of possibly greater importance" than Marbury's. To the
Editor, JENKS' PORTLAND GAZETTE (Me.), Feb. 21, 1803, supp. at 1.
179. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 34-50 (1803).
180. Id. at 52.
181. Id.at55.
182. For more on the procedural obstacles to a hypothetical suit involving the midnight judges,
see CURRIE, supra note 35, at 20 n.83.
183. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; Letter from of Philip Key to William Tilghman
(July 19, 1802) (on file with Md. Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers) ("[T]he Opinion of the
Judge of the supreme court [to ride circuit] defeats any remedy by Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Assize,
and a plea to their jurisdiction .. . because their proceeding to discharge our duties, predetermines the
Question as to our right of exercising any courts.").
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the courts assume more?"'1 5 On the basis of these objections, the Senate
rejected the measure 15-13.'
The press paid little attention to the petition's failure. The Federalist
New York Evening Post muttered that "President Jefferson, and the
majorities in the two Houses of Congress, dare not submit the claim of the
Circuit Judges for their compensation to judicial examination and
decision"; another paper carried an anonymous letter from Washington
noting that "[t]he memorial of the Circuit Judges has been dismissed
without much ceremony, by those who, in feeling power, appear to forget
there are such principles as right and wrong.""' Compared to the piercing
tirades that had poured forth in 1802, however, this was rather tame.
Some Republican newspapers predictably savaged the memorial. The
radical Aurora took a patronizing tone, declaring, "The judges, who met
below the people a short time ago in Philadelphia, this day brought forth
the mouse from the mountain-a petition . . . on the subject of their
salaries.""' Another paper mocked, somewhat unfairly, "Although we are
out of office . .. yet we will sweat the people out of 2,000 dollars a year if
we can.-What disinterested patriots these must be, who are willing to
accept the public money without any pretension to public services!"' 89
Generally, though, papers on both sides presented the memorials with
very little editorial comment, perhaps preferring not to revisit battles that
had been fought with more vigor a year earlier.
Some Republicans now fully expected the circuit judges to go to the
Supreme Court. "The Judges have made their debi'st and have a proper
cong6 [dismissal]," Representative Caesar Rodney recorded. "The
opposition will try [the issue] perhaps in every shape of which this
political Proteus is capable."' 9 0 Instead, having tried and failed to appeal
to the Court, to Congress, and to the public, the judges let the matter rest.
VI.
It took several years following the repeal controversy for the danger to
185. Id. at 58.
186. Id. at 78.
187. Logic, N.Y. EVENING POST, Feb. 9, 1803, at 3 (emphasis omitted); PROVIDENCE GAZETTE,
Feb. 19, 1803, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
188. From Washington, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. 2, 1803, at 2 (emphasis
omitted). This passage is the only public reference to either of the judges' meetings I located in my
research.
189. Federal Patriotism, PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, Feb. 12, 1803, at 2. For other attacks on the
judges' motives, see AM. CITIZEN (N.Y.C.), Feb. 9, 1803, at 2; Circuit Judges, NAT'L AEGIS
(Worcester, Mass.), Feb. 16, 1803, at 3; and KLINE'S CARLISLE WEEKLY GAZETTE (Pa.), Feb. 9,
1803, at 2.




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss2/3
Glickstein
the judiciary to subside. Shortly after the judges' memorial was rejected,
the House moved to impeach Judge John Pickering. Pickering was a
Federalist, an alcoholic, and probably insane. Indeed, as a circuit judge,
Jeremiah Smith had discretely assumed some of Pickering's duties to
prevent a scandal.19 ' Though there was some question as to whether
Pickering's mental deficiencies constituted "misbehavior" under the
Constitution, the Senate removed him from office.192 His removal set the
stage for an even more tempting target.
On March 26, 1804, the House impeached Justice Samuel Chase. They
charged him with a variety of offenses, including an 1803 charge to a
Baltimore grand jury in which he forcefully denounced the repeal of the
Judiciary Act of 1801.193 After the House formed a committee to
investigate the charges against Chase, Senator William Plumer lamented
that the Supreme Court and circuit judges had not resisted the repeal in
1802, for "then was the time . . . to have taken their stand against the
encroachments of Congress & the Executive." 94 Visions of another
judicial purge flashed before the Federalists' eyes. Oliver Wolcott dashed
off a note to Roger Griswold, worrying that the Republicans might
"subvert[] the Judicial Department, or what would be still worse,
convert[] it, into an active Engine for gratifying the vengeance of our
fluctuating factions."l 95 Once more, the Federalists saw the country
moving toward chaos.
The impeachment trial, which convened in February 1805, was a major
piece of political theater. John Marshall was asked to testify on Chase's
behalf but, ever wary of further provocation, lent his associate only
lukewarm support. 9 6 Yet when the Senate gave its verdict, the consensus
was that Chase's defense team-which included, in an ironic touch, Philip
Key-had far outclassed the opposition.19' The Republicans, previously
so steadfast, now wavered. Significant numbers broke ranks on each
count, while the Federalists voted unanimously to acquit.' Chase kept
191. See 37 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 462-63 (Letter from John Langdon to
Thomas Jefferson and editorial note).
192. The episode is described in PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA,
1635-1805, at 206-18 (1948).
193. See Stephen B. Presser, Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and Against the
Jeffersonians, 62 VAND. L. REV. 349, 363-65 (2009).
194. WILLIAM PLUMER, MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 1803-
1807, at 101-03 (1923).
195. Letter from Roger Griswold to Oliver Wolcott (Jan. 8, 1804) (on file with Yale Univ., Lane
Collection, Manuscripts & Archives); Letter from Oliver Wolcott to Roger Griswold (Jan. 14, 1804)
(on file with Yale Univ., Lane Collection, Manuscripts & Archives).
196. See JAMES HAW, STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 232 (1980).
197. Id. at 239-40. In another reversal, Chase reached out to William Tilghman for help in
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his job, and the threat to the judiciary receded.
Following the rejection of the memorial, the circuit judges dispersed to
many of the state and national institutions they had thought so threatened
by the repeal. William Tilghman became chief justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, where he served for over two decades. His eulogist later
remarked that Tilghman never spoke of his time as a circuit judge, finding
it too painful to recount.' 99 Jeremiah Smith remained chief justice of New
Hampshire until 1809, resigned to serve as governor, and later returned to
the bench. His biographer called the loss of his office "the severest
disappointment that Judge Smith experienced in his public life."200 Oliver
Wolcott tempered his views, becoming, of all things, a moderate
Republican (though never a Jeffersonian), and later serving as governor of
Connecticut. Egbert Benson left politics, founded the New York
Historical Society, and returned to the House for a term in 1813. His one-
time colleague Philip Key served in three successive Congresses
beginning in 1807. Others, like Richard Bassett and Benjamin Bourne,
seem to have left public life more or less uneventfully. A few were less
fortunate. Without his judicial salary, Samuel Hitchcock could not pay his
creditors, and he spent the end of 1803 in a debtors' prison; poor
investments led to William Griffith's bankruptcy in 1812, as well.20 1
Bruce Ackerman, speculating about the misinterpreted Reed case,
conjectures that the midnight judges chose not to go before the Supreme
Court because "they were more interested in the future of the Federalist
Supreme Court than in their private bank balances." 202 This is not entirely
right. The judges cared a great deal about their private bank balances.
From the very beginning, the pressure to earn income and replace their
lost salaries hurt the judges' cause. 203 And because Congress refused to
give the judges anything to do, their claims for their salaries-although
analytically distinct from their claims to judicial duties-stood little
chance of changing public or congressional opinion. As the Macon
Telegraph put it in a retrospective on the midnight appointments written
in 1888, "No very permanent interest could be taken in a question which
resolved itself into whether sixteen very excellent gentlemen should
continue or not to draw salaries from the United States treasury at the rate
of $2,000 a year."204
199. HORACE BINNEY, EULOGIES UPON WILLIAM TILGHMAN AND JOHN MARSHALL 14 (Phila.,
C. Sherman & Son 1861).
200. MORISON, supra note 91, at 150.
201. Holt, supra note I1, at 23; Griffith, William, 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 625,
626 (1931).
202. ACKERMAN, supra note I1, at 197-98.
203. See supra notes 97-99, 152-153 and accompanying text.
204. Midnight Judges: An Interesting Leaf from Early American History, MACON TELEGRAPH
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At the same time, the judges were not naYve. They were well aware of
the challenges they faced, and their efforts were as much about
discharging a duty as actually reversing the repeal. "By presenting the
Memorial we have acquitted ourselves to ourselves and to our Friends,"
Egbert Benson wrote as the matter moved toward Congress, "and the next
thing, as far as Truth and Justice will permit, is to put our enemies in the
array and expose them, and here I suspect our wishes, hopes and efforts
will terminate."205 In bits and pieces, the midnight judges offered up a
constitutional argument that attempted to vindicate judicial independence
even as it recognized the primacy of popular sovereignty. Nevertheless,
their eventual failure was probably over determined-hostile public
opinion, jurisdictional obstacles, political realignment, and a cautious
Court all played a role.
In later years, the Repeal Act's precedential value was murky, giving
rise to "a limping and stunted concept of branch independence" in the
young Republic. 20 6 So too at the state level. In 1807, the Ohio legislature
tried to impeach the state supreme court; when that failed, they reduced
the length of the judges' terms of office. Initially, the judges refused to
leave the bench, and an open crisis seemed likely before they backed
down.207 Years later, in 1824, Kentucky lawmakers abolished the state's
highest court following a series of anti-debtor rulings and created a new
one composed of their ideological allies. Unlike the midnight judges, the
Kentucky judges chose to flout the legislature and continued to hear
appeals. The resulting schism, with parallel courts taking cases,
empanelling juries, and issuing indictments, was an endless source of
confusion until 1826, when supporters of the old court were able to
reinstate the original judges and end the crisis. 208  Still later, in
Pennsylvania, the state attorney general filed a writ of quo warranto
seeking a declaration that a state judge, whose district had been abolished
and absorbed into another, had no right to exercise his office. 209 The court
held that the legislature's repeal was invalid insofar as it deprived the
judge of his guaranteed tenure, basically adopting the constitutional
position advanced by the midnight judges sixty years earlier.2 10
(Ga.), Sept. 16, 1888, at 10.
205. Letter from Egbert Benson to William Tilghman (Jan. 27[?], 1803) (on file with Md.
Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
206. Charles Geyh & Emily Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in the Early
Republic, 74 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 31, 77 (1998).
207. See Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Convulses a Nation". The Early Republic's
Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REv. 826, 839 (2004).
208. Id. at 845-55.
209. Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Pa. 343 (1869).
210. Id. at 349-50; see also People ex rel. Ballou v. Dubois, 23 Ill. 547 (1860) (holding similarly
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About six months after Congress rejected the judges' petition, John
Marshall wrote to Oliver Wolcott, congratulating him on his move to New
York City to begin a new career in business. Finally, the Chief Justice
joked, Wolcott was "taking a station to be held really, not nominally,
during good behavior." 2 11 Considering that the Supreme Court had done
almost nothing to defend the vitality of this principle, Wolcott could be
forgiven if Marshall's wisecrack fell flat. But he could also be satisfied
that the midnight judges had, on the whole, conducted themselves well.
As Wolcott put it in his initial draft of the memorial, "Having thus
expressed their convictions, the undersigned leave the result to the
wisdom of Congress; & if their decision shall be adverse to the right
hereby claimed, to the experience of future times. "212
211. Letter from John Marshall to Oliver Wolcott (Aug. 15, 1803), in 6 PAPERS OF MARSHALL,
supra note 51, at 197.
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